Theodicy vs. Ethical Imperative

Theodicy is an attempt to rationalize why evil persists even in the presence of a 'good' God. The nature of the concept vindicates the divine and attempts to bring meaning to both suffering and evil. Critics argue support of theodicy often leads to redemptive suffering

Levinas like Nietzsche and Pinn rejects the notion of theodicy and the placid effects it has on its adherents. He pushes it aside because it objectifies and celebrates suffering instead of moving to remove its existence. According to his doctrine theodicy is not limited to only religion. Levinas states that theodicy exists among atheists in a watered down form which puts stock in ‘the good’ triumphing over natural and historical laws of injustice and misery. The correct approach to the problem of evil is to recognize that theodicy is over. The violence and evil suffered in Auschwitz and other 20^th century landmark events are testament to the ineffectiveness of the current response to evil. Therefore Levinas is forced to explore a new and radical approach to respond to this dilemma.                                                       

  The need to make sense of evil presents a temptation to integrate it with reason. Levinas views evil as an element which is impossible to synthesize or fully comprehend in totality and as a result we must come up with a moral law devoid of its justification or of a ‘Happy End’. Theodicy has been the most common response we have studied to the problem of evil; Levinas introduces an ethical response to this conundrum. It is a radically innovative approach that attempts to lead those interested to the understanding of an unbalanced and nonreciprocal responsibility human beings have to relieve the suffering of the other; the neighbor. Levinas moves further than just rejecting theodicy; he attaches to it the blame for all immorality. He gives an example of a Nazi soldier who aided Jewish Partisans by supplying them with forged papers and transportation. While the hero was executed for his courageous acts of valor, it is obvious in hindsight that if more by-standers acted with the same ethical responsibility as the soldier, the stories regarding the fate of the Jews during the Second World War might have been much different.                                                                                                         

In the next section of his discursion Levinas breaks down the phenomenology of evil into three segments: evil as excess, evil as intention and the hatred of the horror of evil.  Evil as excess contends that one cannot fully comprehend evil as it transcends our understanding. Levinas is quick to point out that this transcendence is not related to the divine but is rather an imminent transcendence, simply outside the realm of what humans can experience. However, just because we are unable to fully understand it does not license us to be passive by-standers in its presence.                                                       

  Evil as intention arises from the sense of the pointedness of wickedness. The direct nature of suffering is often the cause of anger and confusion. When someone experiences an unfortunate event, more often than not their first thoughts include the question, “Why me?” The danger of resorting to theodicy is obvious in this situation as it simple way to absolve needless suffering and give it meaning. However Levinas responds by elevating the ethical over the ontological. Rather than musing over why there is evil occurring rather than good, one must glimpse beyond ontology and consider the ethical imperative.                                                                                                                                                                                        

The third segment of the phenomenology of evil is hatred of the horror of evil. Levinas believes that in response to the problem of evil and destruction the ethical imperative represents the best way to confront this hatred. Rather than being primarily concerned with one’s own life, one should recognize that ‘there is something more important’ than one’s life; ‘that is the life of the other’. While he understands that there is something unreasonable about this concept, especially amongst the selfish nature inherent in all human beings, he insists that it has undeniable value. I agree. Evil springs forth and runs rampant when nothing is done to impede its progress. We all bear responsibility for the health and safety of our neighbors, especially in the communal society in which we reside today. This imperative may be asymmetric in relation to costs and benefits, but is necessary if we intend curb evil or perhaps one day even keep evil at bay.